
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TOWARDS A NEW U.S.-CUBA POLICY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

TOWARDS A NEW U.S.-CUBA POLICY 7
Dealing with Castro 7
Castro: A Unique Ally of the Soviet Union 9
Current Domestic Conditions and Vulnerabilities 12
The Rectification Campaign 14
Current International Conditions and Vulnerabilities 16
Framework For a New U.S. Policy 18
Policy Recommendations 20
I. Diplomatic Policy Recommendations 20
II. Economic Policy Recommendations 21
III. Military/Intelligence Policy Recommendations 23
IV. Defection Policy Recommendations 24
V. Informational/Educational Policy Recommendations 24
VI. Immigration Policy Recommendations 26
VII. Human Rights 26
Conclusions 27

INTRODUCTION

As long-time participants in the debate on how the United States should deal with Fidel Castro's Cuba, we have often been asked exactly what an effective U.S. policy should entail. This question assumes an even greater importance in 1988 as the American people will elect a new president - the eighth to have to deal with the problem of Castro's Cuba. With this in mind, the Cuban American National Foundation has prepared this monograph to serve as a general briefing on the current state of affairs in Castro's Cuba and to offer a variety of policy options designed to counter the many dimensions of Castro's anti-Americanism.

Towards a New U.S.-Cuba Policy is not intended as a blueprint or master plan for a new U.S. policy. Rather, it seeks to stimulate debate on Cuba and to encourage policymakers and other national leaders to seize the initiative in formulating a more effective and comprehensive policy towards Cuba. Such an action is imperative in light of many critics' claim that a lack of both political will and national consensus has allowed this small Caribbean island-nation to project itself as a world power, promoting anti-American sentiment and jeopardizing the fragile resurgence of democracy in Latin America.

In the following pages, we posit that Fidel Castro's current domestic crises and his declining international fortunes present excellent opportunities to once and for all bring an end to the Cuban threat to our national security. We also wish to emphasize that it presents an opportunity to realize another objective, one that has been largely ignored over the past thirty years: restoring democracy to Cuba. While this indeed constitutes a challenge for U.S. foreign policy, it is wholly consistent with its historical purpose - that is, the promotion and defense of freedom and democracy in all quarters of the world.

Jorge L. Mas Canosa
Chairman

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Seven American presidents have had to deal with a southern neighbor who has openly proclaimed that his "true destiny" is to wage war against the United States. Now, as Americans enter the 1988 presidential election year, it is time to reappraise U.S. policy towards that neighbor, Fidel Castro, and his government. The new president and Congress must develop a policy that will serve U.S. strategic interests, advance the prospects for democracy in Cuba, promote orderly and progressive development in the Caribbean Basin, and further the cause of regional and world peace.

Few leaders in the contemporary world have had a fuller agenda than Fidel Castro and yet today he is weighed down by seemingly intractable domestic problems and declining international prospects. Throughout his life he has gambled heavily - and often successfully - in Cuba, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. The temptation to do so again is certain to grow in the months and years ahead as the policies Castro has devised to meet his domestic crisis are more likely to increase than diminish the regime's weaknesses and vulnerabilities at home and abroad.

Unlike the leaders of most other communist countries - notably the Soviet Union - Castro is trying to overcome domestic apathy and stagnation by increasing the centralization of both society and production and by using moral rather than material incentives. He tried this route in the late 1960s and destroyed the nation's economy. He is nevertheless trying it again, and already tensions have arisen both within Cuba and with his life-sustaining ally, the Soviet Union. As the Cuban economy continues to deteriorate, as it almost certainly will so long as Castro pursues his current policies, these tensions are almost certain to increase.

The immediate reaction of many American leaders will be that this is, then, the time for the United States to relax its pressures on Cuba to woo Castro into an accommodation. This line, however, fails to take into account the fact that long before he took power Castro pledged that his "true destiny" was a prolonged war against the United States. Castro did not turn to the Soviet Union in 1959 because the United States "pushed" him in that direction (as Cuban officials and many in this country would have us believe), but because he needed the shield of America's foremost enemy to protect him while he pursued his anti-American agenda. His policies over twenty-eight years have shown with remarkable consistency that his life's goal has not changed. Castro is not interested in "meeting the U.S. halfway" on issues of substance - central among them the

Soviet-Cuban alliance and Cuba's involvement in wars abroad - as Presidents Ford and Carter found when they tried to reach an accommodation with him in the mid-1970s. History demonstrates that to believe otherwise is to engage in very dangerous wishful thinking.

The critical issue for the United States, and for American allies in the Caribbean Basin and beyond, is that the Soviet alliance with Cuba brought the East/West conflict into the Caribbean Basin in 1959, just as twenty-five years of Sandinista ties to Cuba pulled the East/West dispute into Central America two decades later. Any U.S. policy towards Cuba must be built on a recognition of the fact that the Soviet-Cuban alliance, which has guaranteed Castro's staying power for nearly three decades, also and above all has made Cuba a lethal instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

There is no stronger testimony to the importance of Cuba to the Soviet Union than the fact that between 1982 and 1986 alone Soviet economic aid to Cuba amounted to nearly $24 billion - more than the total Soviet economic aid to all other countries in the world combined. During that same period Soviet military aid to Cuba came to almost $8 billion. To provide some perspective on this, U.S. economic and military aid to all of Central America during those years amounted to $4.4 billion.

Soviet aid to Cuba has allowed Fidel Castro to assume a disproportionate and undeserved role as an international actor. Since his seizure of power in 1959, Fidel Castro has involved himself in the affairs of an extraordinary number of countries, always contrary to U.S. interests. He regularly maintains more troops in Africa than Batista had in his entire army and provides regular support and/or training to terrorist groups in Central and South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and even on U.S. territory.

Fidel Castro's anti-Americanism is also directed at U.S. society. Among the 125,000 Cubans who fled to the U.S. in the 1980 Mariel exodus were included several thousand criminals and psychopaths. Castro currently facilitates the entry of illegal narcotics into this country, harbors U.S. criminals, creates tension and conflict within the U.S. body politic, and targets his most extensive intelligence operations against the U.S.

Under these circumstances, the United States should develop a prudent policy of carefully increased and coordinated pressures on the Castro government within the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. ties with the other countries of the Western Hemisphere. To this end, the Soviet Union should be pressured to rein in Castro. The United

States must also demonstrate that it has a true and long-term interest in resolving the trade and debt problems, as well as security issues, afflicting its allies and neighbors in the Caribbean Basin and beyond.

In its bilateral relations with Cuba, the United States should pursue three explicit objectives: the cessation of Castro's international ventures; the termination of the Soviet-Cuban alliance; and the democratization of the island. These objectives can be realized by undertaking the following, among other, actions:

1. Proclaim officially that the United States no longer feels bound by the 1962 Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement, a move which would open the door to broader U.S. measures against Soviet/Cuban subversion in the hemisphere and would allow the U.S. to work with those forces inside Cuba which seek its democratization.
2. Actively support groups fighting against Cuban-supported regimes in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan and coordinate anti-terrorist efforts in the hemisphere.
3. Increase assistance to any government resisting a Cuban-supported insurgency.
4. Review relations with any country which maintains a Cuban military presence, and raise the costs to the host country of that presence.
5. Strengthen and enforce the economic embargo against Cuba and extend it to Angola.
6. Introduce legislation to deny benefits to U.S. trade partners who also trade with Cuba.
7. Communicate to Western banks and creditors information on Cuba's economic state and its inability to repay its debts.
8. Actively prosecute violators of the embargo, among them those companies that enter into joint economic ventures with the Cuban government.
9. Publicize the number of and encourage defections of top Cuban leaders and disseminate their stories to the public.
10. Increase contact with the people of Cuba by, among other measures, expanding Radio Martí broadcasts to 24 hours a day and introducing a TV Martí.

TOWARDS A NEW U.S.-CUBA POLICY

Fidel Castro and his critics have finally found something they can agree on: the Cuban Revolution is in trouble and has reached a critical stage in its twenty-eight year history. Castro has lately focused much attention on Cuba's deepening economic crisis and apathetic work force and is currently implementing drastic domestic policies to try to get the revolution on what he considers the right track. Similar policies two decades ago -which focused on increasing centralized decisionmaking and moral (as opposed to material) incentives for Cuban workers - wreaked havoc on Cuban society and foreign relations. Already there are hints that some such upheaval may occur again.

The volatility of the situation today is compounded by the fact that the historical record reveals that under circumstances like these the Cuban leader is most likely to undertake some audacious international act in an effort to both distract attention from Cuba's domestic crisis and reassert his own presence in the global arena.

The current crisis provides an occasion for the United States to make a careful reappraisal of Castro, his policies, and U.S. policy toward his regime. Indeed, we at the Cuban American National Foundation firmly believe such a reappraisal is imperative in order for the new president and congress to implement a policy towards Cuba that will serve U.S. strategic interests, result in the political, economic, and social betterment of the Cuban people, promote orderly, progressive development in the Caribbean Basin, and advance the prospects of regional and world peace.

This monograph, *Towards a New U.S.-Cuba Policy,* was prepared by the Cuban American National Foundation to serve as a briefing on current Cuban domestic and international policies and to prescribe new policy initiatives to deal with Cuba's unique and problematic "Maximum Leader."

DEALING WITH CASTRO

Many Americans seem to be of the opinion that the reason why the U.S. and Cuba cannot get along is because the U.S. has never sought to meet Castro "halfway" on the issues which separate them. This halfway formula, with compromise on both sides, has worked occasionally in the past on secondary issues when both parties have something substantial to gain and ideology does not erect an insuperable barrier (e.g., immigra-

tion). However, in examining the major differences between the two - central among them Cuba's alliance with the Soviet Union and involvement in wars abroad - to Castro they remain steadfastly nonnegotiable. Just as compromise on basic issues did not dissuade Hitler from pursuing his ambitions (despite the efforts of Neville Chamberlain), it has never worked with Castro.

"To understand Cuban foreign policy," Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt wrote at the beginning of their perceptive book *Castro, Cuba and the World,* "one must first understand Fidel Castro." We would add that in order to formulate and conduct an effective U.S. policy towards Cuba one must also begin with Castro, for in a sense the Cuban leader himself has, by his goals and actions, virtually dictated Washington's policy towards Havana since 1959.

As early as 1955 Castro told *"Che"* Guevara that the Cuban revolution he sought to ignite was simply part of "the continental struggle against the Yankees that Bolívar and Martí had already foreseen." In 1958, while he was fighting in the Sierra Maestra, Castro wrote a confidante that when the dictator Fulgencio Batista had been overthrown, his "true destiny" would be to wage a "much wider and bigger war" against the United States. This mission, and an extraordinary determination to become a major actor on the world stage, prompted the charismatic Cuban leader to secure the support and shield of a powerful anti-U.S. ally in the Soviet Union and, in as many ways as possible, to assist movements throughout the world fighting the "Yankees." These facts are paramount in Hugh Thomas' monumental history, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom,* and in former *New York Times* correspondent Tad Szulc's biography, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait.*

Giving many examples, Gonzalez and Ronfeldt argue that Castro's childhood, student life, and subsequent career demonstrate "a pattern of conflictive, duplicitous behavior" which can be broken down into the following components:

1. violence-prone rebelliousness, which, even when risky, often yielded much higher returns than conformity;
2. manipulative confrontation to force concessions from allies as well as adversaries;
3. extortion to deter or intimidate an opponent;
4. vengeful punishment against those who have thwarted him;
5. claiming high principles to mask his own self-interest; and,
6. deceitfulness to conceal his intentions.

The perils of negotiating with an individual like Castro are quite evident when one examines the historical record. In the mid- and late-1970s, the United States, under Presidents Ford and then Carter, tried to break the bilateral deadlock and improve relations with Cuba. When President Ford tried to relax tensions in 1975 - and after the U.S. Congress passed the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. aid to anti-communist insurgents in Angola - Castro sent tens of thousands of combat troops to that strategic country, where they remain today. President Carter went even further toward rapprochement by establishing secondary diplomatic relations with Havana and coming close to authorizing bilateral business dealings. Castro's response was to send approximately 15,000 troops to Ethiopia, where they used $1 billion in Soviet arms to turn the tide in the East African war. He then engineered the 1980 Mariel exodus, allowing 125,000 Cubans to flee to the U.S., but including among them thousands of criminals and psychopaths.

Many analysts have tried to figure out why Castro has such a virulent hatred of the United States when most of his fellow Cubans do not. And while that answer cannot be determined with certainty, the fact of Castro's hatred and relentless pursuit of his "destiny" - despite occasional tactical retreats - is undeniable.

CASTRO: A UNIQUE ALLY OF THE SOVIET UNION

Fidel Castro became a serious problem for the United States when he linked his anti-American agenda with that of the Soviet Union. Tad Szulc's biography has conclusively demolished the old myth that Castro turned to the Soviet Union because of U.S. hostility. His turn was clearly by design and, by and large, it has paid off very well for him. In most respects it has paid off for the Soviet Union too, despite serious tensions that have arisen during several periods, not least since the recent ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev as the top Soviet leader (see below).

Castro has used Soviet support to pursue his vendetta against the United States, and to do so much more effectively than he could have done on his own. Even when serious differences existed on domestic and international issues, Cuba received life-sustaining aid from the Soviet bloc. According to U.S. State Department figures released in October 1987, Soviet bloc economic aid to Cuba between 1982 and 1986 amounted to $23.5 billion, while military aid during those five years came to almost $8 billion - for a combined total of $31.5 billion. (By way of

contrast, U.S. military and economic aid to all of Central America during those five years, measured in total official gross dollars - the Western measures most comparable to estimated Soviet deliveries - came to only $4.4 billion.) While Castro has retained varying degrees of independence over the decades, Soviet aid has pulled Cuba through major economic crises, has brought in invaluable managerial, intelligence, and other training, has made possible the development of the largest, best-equipped and most experienced military in Latin America (with an armed force of about 300,000), and has enabled Castro to assume a disproportionate and undeserved role as an international actor.

The main point, however, is not how the Soviet Union has helped Cuba, but how Castro has promoted the interests of the Soviet Union: he injected the East-West competition into the heart of the Western Hemisphere, which had previously been beyond the reach - if not the dreams - of Soviet policymakers.

Over the decades, and especially since the mid-1970s, Castro's activities have been a major component of Soviet world strategy - most notably in Angola, Ethiopia, and the Caribbean Basin - and have significantly advanced Soviet political, strategic, and even military objectives. There is no stronger testimony to that truth than the fact that the aforementioned Soviet economic aid to Cuba, given despite the trials of dealing with the often headstrong Cuban leader, came to more than the total Soviet economic aid to all other countries in the world combined.

To fulfill his end of the bargain, Castro has permitted the establishment in Cuba of the most sophisticated Soviet intelligence facility outside the U.S.S.R. - at Lourdes near Havana - a facility which is off-limits to Cubans and is maintained by 2100 Soviet intelligence technicians. Cuban ports and airbases serve as invaluable platforms for projecting Soviet military power into the Western Hemisphere. The large submarine base at Cienfuegos places Soviet nuclear submarines astride vital shipping lanes in the Caribbean and within a two-day transit time of the main U.S. naval bases at Norfolk and Charleston. Cuban air bases enable Soviet long-range reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft to fly spy and training missions along the east coast of the U.S.

Beyond that, Castro has deployed several hundred thousand Cuban personnel to Soviet-serving ventures in Africa and the Middle East. In 1973, Cuban troops fought alongside Syria in the Yom Kippur War with Israel. According to U.S. State Department statistics in 1984, Cuba had military and technical advisers in twenty-four African countries, including Libya, Algeria, and Mozambique. In 1988, 40,000 Cuban troops prop

up the Marxist government of José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola, while a smaller contingent performs the same function for Mengistu Haile Miriam in Ethiopa.

Cuba's role as a center and source of subversive and terrorist activities in the Western Hemisphere - particularly in the strategically critical Caribbean Basin - is well-documented. Castro has carefully nurtured Soviet-bloc allies in Nicaragua (the Sandinistas), in Grenada (Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement) prior to the U.S. intervention there in 1983, and, over the years, has worked to build up and unify at least twenty-seven active Marxist-Leninist insurgent groups operating in the region - totalling about 25,000 armed and trained members in late 1987. According to the U.S. Southern Command, these groups, with the main exception of Peru's *Sendero Luminoso,* are all known to be supported by Cuba. SOUTHCOM and U.S. State Department analysts have estimated that a minimum of 20,000 individuals from around the world, including over 10,000 Latin Americans, had attended one or more of the more than fifty guerrilla or terrorist training courses offered in Cuban military facilities since Castro came to power.*

Among those groups that receive regular support and/or training from Cuba are the Palestine Liberation Organization, the *Macheteros* in Puerto Rico, the *ETA* in Spain, the *FMLN* in El Salvador, the *URNG* in Guatemala, the *FHLP* in Honduras, the *M-19* in Colombia, the *AVC* in Ecuador, the *MRTA* in Peru, the *FPMR* in Chile, and *SWAPO* in South-West Africa (Namibia).**

Last, and by no means least, Castro maintains an elaborate and extensive espionage capability which functions as a surrogate for the KGB in conducting espionage against the U.S. The Cuban DGI operates out of the Cuban embassy in Ottawa, Canada; the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; the Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York; and, since the late 1970s, out of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C.; and has been exposed numerous times. In February 1981, the

(*See *New York Times,* March 3, 1987, "Latin Guerrillas Joining Forces, U.S. Officers Say," *Latin American Weekly Report,* November 5, 1987, "Guerrilla Forces '25,000 Strong'," and U.S. Department of State, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, March 1985.*)

(**See R.A. Hudson, "Castro's America Department: Systemizing Insurgencies in Latin America," *Terrorism: An International Journal,* vol. 9, no. 2 (1987), pp. 125-167, and Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network,* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981.)

second-ranking Cuban diplomat in the U.S. was expelled for conducting intelligence and conspiring to violate the embargo on trade with Cuba. In July 1982, two Cuban officials at the U.N. were expelled for attempting to illegally purchase sophisticated television satellite monitoring equipment. In July 1983, two more Cubans were expelled for conducting "hostile intelligence activities." According to the U.S. State Department, what they were doing was of "a very sensitive nature." In July 1987, the acting chief of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington and another official there were expelled. They were later described by the State Department as "intelligence agents engaged in activities inconsistent with their diplomatic functions."

CURRENT DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND VULNERABILITIES

Among the key features of the current situation in Cuba are the following:

The **economic situation** is at one of its lowest points since Castro assumed power - this due to Castro's inclination to mandate inefficient and personally-directed programs which have suppressed the innate creative and entrepreneurial spirit of the Cuban people. The current problem is evident in varied but interrelated ways, including the so-called "rectification" process consisting of increased economic centralization, a proliferation of time-consuming and evidently unproductive assemblies and meetings, and an emphasis on moral rather than material incentives for workers. The Cuban work force is afflicted with absenteeism, apathy, lack of discipline, incompetence, widespread work stoppages, inadequate technical knowledge, and unemployment in some sectors and overemployment in others. It is also plagued with production shortfalls (see below) and a relaxation of standards attributable to the above problems as well as to a lack of fertilizers, raw materials, spare and new parts, and bad weather.

Furthermore, Cuba has suffered a disastrous 40-50% decline in foreign exchange earnings, due in large part to a fall in the price of the Soviet oil the Cubans resell for Western currency, and also to the low international market price for sugar and the lingering impact of the U.S. economic embargo. The island's foreign debt of approximately $5 billion to Western creditors and a debt of at least $10 billion to the Soviet bloc makes it one of the most indebted countries per-capita in Latin America. Finally, as a result of declining foreign exchange, Cuba has been unable to pay

interest on the foreign debt and has cut back on expenditures on imports from the West (e.g., spare parts, food, and other items) during 1987 to half of the $1.2 billion spent in 1986.

Sugar remains the backbone of the Cuban economy just as much as it was when Castro took over in 1959, though most of it now goes to the Soviet bloc instead of the United States. In 1986-87 sugar production came to about seven million metric tons, considerably below the targeted output of more than eight million tons. There were shortfalls also in the production of tomato, potato, plantain, and tobacco crops, while there were more satisfactory results in the production of some meats and dairy products.

While Castro has from the beginning wanted to diversify the economy, efforts to industrialize during the early 1960s failed miserably and by the end of that decade Cuba's position as a producer of agricultural products for the Soviet bloc appeared entrenched. Over the past two years the Soviets have made it particularly clear that Cuba's main role in the East bloc's Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) would continue to be primarily that of a provider of agricultural products and raw materials.

Dissension is rising among the Cuban people in general - particularly among the young - and within major political and other institutions. Evidence of this has emerged in recent years from such varied sources as Cuban Communist Party officials (especially during and after the Third Party Congress in 1986) and from refugees. Among the latter, two defectors who came to the United States in mid-1987 stand out: Brigadier General Rafael del Pino Diaz, a hero of the war against Batista and a deputy commander of the Cuban Air Force with extensive experience in Angola, and Major Florentino Azpillaga, a ranking Cuban intelligence officer who was stationed in Europe.

The unrest among rank-and-file Cubans continues to derive from economic hardships and political deprivation. The latest rectification program does not appeal to them. There is growing resentment over the sending of young Cubans to African wars, particularly the protracted one in Angola, and the refusal of the Cuban government to even bring the bodies of the dead home for burial (General del Pino says 10,000 Cubans have been wounded, died in action or of illness, or are missing in Angola, while the desertion rate in the armed forces continues to be alarmingly high). Cuba is also experiencing an AIDS crisis, which the government only admitted after broadcasts on the subject by the USIA's Radio Martí. The people are also well aware of the increasingly obvious corrup-

tion and favoritism within the government bureaucracy and among top government leaders, including the Castro brothers themselves.

Discontent has led to an "imminent social explosion," according to del Pino, and has resulted in the formation of special police shock troops and the first police purchases of riot helicopters. Workers and consumers, who for almost three decades have been told that their sacrifices will greatly improve their lives, have now been told that the economic future will be bleak until at least the year 2000. Heightening discontent will also place Castro on the horns of another dilemma: it will most likely force his highly efficient internal security apparatus to tighten its grip on the Cuban people at a time when Castro is hard-pressed to clean up his international image regarding human rights in Cuba.

As societal tensions increase, differences between the 525,000-member Communist Party and the 300,000-member Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are also likely to increase - and here the insights of General del Pino are particularly revealing. While the Castro brothers have cultivated loyalty to themselves within the Party, del Pino alludes to a "nationalist" element within the FAR. He reveals that fellow officers persuaded him not to simply retire in disillusionment, but to go abroad and tell what he knows about Cuba today. Many of these officers, he says, have had their eyes opened in the war in Angola, where they now see themselves as mercenaries of the Soviet Union entangled in "Cuba's Vietnam." The career officer class, he adds, "does not believe in and has no faith in the leaders of the revolution." Many believe that "Cuba is collapsing" and that "the country has been led into a quagmire by the group that holds power." He also reports "a big conflict between the high- and middle-ranking officials of the Ministry of the Interior and the military."

There are already indications Castro has moved to preempt this nationalist element, as when he formed the 1.2 million-member Territorial Troop Militias in 1980 under his personal control ostensibly to involve the entire population in a possible war with the United States. According to General del Pino, the real purpose of the TTMs is to "serve as a brake on the military in the event of any action against the regime" since "the troops will never fire on the people."

The Rectification Campaign

Castro's response to the economic degeneration of the country and the increasing popular unrest and frustration with his government has been

the rectification program called the "strategic revolutionary counteroffensive."

Back in the late-1960s an all-out sugar production drive - which clearly reflected Castro's belief that political activism and ideological motivation can overcome any economic challenge - virtually destroyed the Cuban economy. Castro, who would not consider closer ties to the United States, turned to the Soviet Union for massive aid. The Soviets, moving to assert control over the Cuban *caudillo,* attached many strings to their aid, ranging from KGB-reorganization of Cuban intelligence to a Soviet-guided program for economic planning and development.

When compared to the disastrous Cuban policies of the 1960s, the new Soviet program was relatively rational and at least focused on some tangible incentives. Cuba's only period of significant growth occurred in the early 1970s, though at least as much because of unusually high sugar prices as because of the Soviet program. Castro, however, had no confidence in the Soviet approach and never gave it his full support - at times he even sabotaged it - so it is impossible to say, as Castro has tried to do, that it led to the economic mess of the present day.

When in the early 1980s Castro began turning back to the ideologically motivated policies of the 1960s, a special vindictiveness was lavished on the Farmers' Free Market. This program, launched in 1980 but substantially restricted by 1982, permitted a degree of guided free-enterprise which immediately began to produce, with considerable efficiency, a wide variety of products the state farms and cooperatives could not offer. Together with an equally short-lived entrepreneurial housing program, which allowed private construction to overcome part of the country's critical housing shortage, the farmers' market clearly demonstrated to Castro the intolerable: that is, the Cuban peoples' receptivity toward and productive use of the free market to improve their own livelihood and that of the nation.

By the end of 1984 Castro began removing top-level Soviet-backed planners and technicians and, in mid-1986, he launched an all-out rejection of the Soviet program, charging that it had been responsible for "many vices, distortions and, worst of all, corruption." He added that it had created "a million problems and a million errors." The program, he suggested, had been plagued by Soviet negligence and inefficiency and carried out incompetently by Cuban state officials, state administrators, and workers.

Castro's response was his "counteroffensive," a medium-profile "cultural revolution," which sought a major overhaul of the economic plan-

ning, production, and distribution systems. While the Soviet Union and other communist countries are decentralizing and adding material incentives, Cuba is adopting a strategy of heightened exhortation, political mobilization, and preaching of socialist ethics and moral incentives. This orientation not only failed in Cuba during the late 1960s but also has been inefficient, or an outright failure, in every other country that has tried it in the 20th century.

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS AND VULNERABILITIES

Castro has traditionally been more intrigued by international than domestic affairs. Domestic problems are too parochial and appear intractable, while international activities have put him on the global stage and afforded the opportunities and attention he craves. There he has been able to raise himself above the role of a petty dictator of a small Caribbean island to the stature of an audacious world leader, a self-appointed setter of revolutionary trends, and a constant challenge to his nemesis, the United States. It is in the international realm that he is able to pursue his anti-American "destiny."

Castro's international fortunes have had their ups and downs. He was supercharged in the 1960s, holding Latin American and Third World revolutionary conferences in Havana and championing guerrilla wars throughout the Western Hemisphere. His policies, however, soon splintered the region's Marxist-Leninist movements, achieved no victories and harvested many revolutionary defeats - including the death of *"Che"* Guevara in Bolivia - and his approach was ultimately condemned by both the Soviet and Chinese camps.

By the mid-1970s Castro had learned to forge unity rather than division among revolutionary groups in target countries and he had found some common revolutionary ground with the Soviet Union, first in Africa and then in the Caribbean Basin. Above all, he provided thousands of troops and pilots for wars in Angola and Ethiopia and, over the years, brought unity to feuding Latin American guerrilla factions, most importantly in Nicaragua and El Salvador. His fortunes peaked in 1979 when his protégés seized power in Grenada and Nicaragua, and when he hosted the Sixth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana. There Castro himself was elected the group's militantly pro-Soviet president for the next three years.

The 1980s have brought some encouraging developments from Cas-

tro's point of view. His diplomatic offensive has resulted in his increasing acceptance by the majority of Latin American governments, not least Brazil and Argentina. This was reflected tangibly in March 1987 when negative votes by Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela assured the defeat of the U.S. motion to include Cuba on the agenda of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and in a November 1987 meeting of the Organization of American States, unattended by the U.S., wherein it was agreed that Cuba should be invited to rejoin the regional organization. He benefited from the Iran/ Contra affair, which dealt a severe blow to the Reagan Administration's credibility and, thus, its policies - most importantly its effort to bring democracy to Nicaragua. The development of an effective espionage capability, as reaffirmed by Major Azpillaga, can likewise not be overlooked.

Overall, however, this decade has seen mainly significant international reverses for Castro, which have both tarnished his image and left him at least as frustrated abroad as he is at home. The most obvious and, in some respects, costly setback was in Grenada in 1983 when his protégé Maurice Bishop was murdered by leaders of his own party, precipitating a U.S. military action, the significance of which was not lost on the Cuban leadership.

Castro's carefully crafted international image is crumbling due to a heightened awareness among the U.S. public and Congress, and the international community, of the human rights situation in Cuba and Castro's subversive activities abroad. This has been brought about in large part through the vigorous informational campaign conducted by former Cuban political prisoner Armando Valladares and a vocal Cuban American community intent on restoring democracy to Cuba. Another significant blow to Castro was the collapse of his internal news monopoly as a result of the creation of the USIA's Radio Martí Program (whose popularity was revealed in a recent independent survey of Cuban emigrés, 86% of which said they listened to the station) - also currently in progress are feasibility studies on a TV Martí. In 1987, there were the highly embarrassing and costly defections of General del Pino and Major Azpillaga, which shook the regime to the core.

Castro's highly-touted policy of "internationalism" has also experienced serious setbacks. A more outgoing, internationally-minded U.S. repealed the Clark Amendment and is providing military and/ or humanitarian assistance to Nicaraguan freedom fighters. In Angola, Castro's expeditionary forces have failed to defeat the popular insurgency of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. In Latin America, no head of state, including

those sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution, has responded to Castro's prolonged campaign to default on their foreign debts. His efforts to promote the compatibility of Marxism and Christianity have likewise been rendered ineffective. In the Third World, Castro has to contend with several leaders - most importantly Libya's Khadafy - vying for the leadership of the anti-imperialist movement. Finally, an apparently more cautious foreign policy of the new Soviet leadership will most likely result in less support for his "internationalism."

Add to this a potentially critical new set of tensions with the Soviet Union. There is a conflict over the very different domestic development models favored by Gorbachev and Castro and the possibility that the Soviet leader will either let the stubborn Cuban leader (and the Cuban people) suffer the consequences of his foolish policies, so long as he meets his internationalist commitments, or intervene to enforce a more rational line. The Soviets have also apparently refused to substantially increase economic aid to Cuba to help Castro cope with deteriorating domestic conditions and to cover international debt and trade payments. In addition, they stopped subsidizing the 200,000 barrels of oil sent to Cuba each day (though Cuba does not have to pay for it in hard currency). Not to be overlooked is the dispute over Cuba's role in COMECON.

There are also indications from the Cuban side of problems with the Soviet Union. Castro has severely criticized the Soviet development plan for Cuba and is determined to pursue his own demonstrably ineffective development program despite Soviet objections. In mid-1986, Castro replaced a very pro-Soviet Cuban ambassador in Moscow with a Cuban long known for his criticism of the Soviet Union. Castro also skipped the funeral of Gorbachev's predecessor Yuri Andropov, and delayed in his attendance at the 70th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Also, this past year witnessed Castro's first visit in a decade to that East European symbol of resistance to Soviet control, Yugoslavia.

FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW U.S. POLICY

In view of the emerging tensions between Cuba and the Soviet Union and Cuba's deteriorating domestic situation, some observers have suggested that now is the time to seek a rapprochement with Castro. This, however, is just what the United States should *not* do. Castro has given no indication that he is willing to cease his openly declared "war" against the U.S. What is needed instead in 1988 and beyond is a new and more comprehensive policy of pressures on the Castro government.

Since 1959 Castro has evaded accountability for scores of distressing activities, including:

* The high level of Soviet influence in Cuba and a prominent military presence there;
* The high level of Soviet/Cuban military cooperation on several continents, including mass Cuban troop deployment in Africa;
* The continued abuse of the basic human rights of the Cuban people;
* Cuba's continuing support for revolutionary and terrorist groups in Latin America and elsewhere;
* Cuba's involvement in drug trafficking to the U.S. and its extensive anti-American espionage efforts.

With these facts in mind, three fundamental objectives should drive U.S. policy towards Cuba: first, the cessation of Castro's international ventures; second, the termination of the Soviet-Cuban alliance; and third, the ultimate democratization of the island. A policy which will realize these objectives should be formulated within the following guidelines:

* Communicate to the disillusioned people of Cuba that the U.S. shares their aspirations for a better way of life and will assist them in any way to achieve it;
* Increase the cost of Soviet aid to Cuba and pressure Moscow to rein in, if not reconsider the value of, the Cuban leader;
* Increase the costs to Cuba of Soviet/Cuban foreign policies by increasing Cuban isolation from the non-communist world and reducing further Cuban access to hard currency;
* Pressure the Soviet government to reconsider its policy toward the Caribbean Basin in general and eliminate its military presence there;
* Tangibly demonstrate U.S. opposition to the use of Cuba for military purposes, whether as a staging ground for guerrilla movements or a base for Soviet planes and submarines;
* Make continuing and deepening Cuban/Nicaraguan alignment more difficult and costly so as to discourage other countries from doing the same;
* Encourage Cuban leaders to question the value to Cuba of Castro's foreign interventionist policies and heavy dependence on the Soviet bloc;
* Demonstrate to our allies, particularly in Central America, that the

United States will support them in their efforts to resist Soviet/Cuban threats to their independence;

* Demonstrate that the United States will help allies to overcome the other political, social, and economic problems which often make them particularly susceptible to domestic instability.

It must be emphasized that any potentially effective U.S. policy towards Cuba, whether a product of a Republican or Democratic administration, must be formulated in the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations. This means the United States should constantly challenge Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to demonstrate that he seeks world peace by applying pressure on Castro to curtail his international activities.

Equally important, the U.S. must approach Cuba in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations, and, in particular, U.S. relations with the Caribbean Basin countries. Regional cooperation must include, and go far beyond, fighting subversion. It must encompass a serious search for effective measures to resolve the critical trade and debt problems which make essential economic growth in the area so much more difficult to achieve and which threaten the democratic advances of recent years.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. policy towards Cuba in the late 1980s should be supplemented so as to include the following:

I. *Diplomatic Policy Recommendations*

1. The United States should formally inform the Soviet Union and Cuba that because of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, and Cuban involvement in Soviet-financed and directed wars and other military activities abroad, the United States will no longer consider itself bound by the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement which, in effect, guarantees that the U.S. will not work to bring a new government to power in Cuba. The renunciation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement will indicate that the United States:

A. Opposes Soviet use of any Third World personnel in any conflict in the Western Hemisphere;

B. Rejects the validity of the Brezhnev Doctrine (which claims that socialism is irreversible) and opposes the use of Soviet or Soviet-bloc troops in any internal conflict on the island;

C. Will not feel constrained from resisting Cuban activities abroad in any way considered appropriate when those activities are seen to threaten the national security of the United States;

D. Will not formally condone the further consolidation of the Castro regime or be constrained from working with democratic forces which seek to change it.

2. The U.S. should conduct a review of its relations with any country which maintains a Cuban technical or military presence. Such a presence should become an issue in relations with said country (if it is not already, e.g., Nicaragua and Angola), and, where feasible, should be met with appropriate actions.

3. The Executive Branch, in consultation with the appropriate government agencies, should prepare an intelligence memorandum on Cuban involvement in the internal affairs of selected Latin American countries and have a presidential envoy deliver the memorandum privately to the appropriate heads of state. The objective will be to encourage suitable responses and to offer low-profile U.S. assistance if it is requested.

4. The United States should actively inform the international community, in the United Nations and other international fora, of Cuba's disruptive international and oppressive domestic policies.

5. The United States should examine the possibility of reducing U.S. diplomatic personnel in Cuba and cutting by the same number Cuban personnel at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington. The U.S. must insist on strict reciprocity in all matters relating to the interests sections in Havana and Washington under the Foreign Missions Act of 1982.

II. *Economic Policy Recommendations*

Beginning in late 1959, Cuban economic policies brought retaliatory measures from the United States. These measures were intended to encourage Castro to reconsider the impact his chosen policies would have on relations with the United States. An embargo on most trade with Cuba was instituted in October 1960 in order to deny hard currency and goods to a government that was defying international law and bilateral commitments, and was oppressing its own citizens. The embargo was reaffirmed by President Kennedy in February and May 1962. In December 1986 Castro asserted that the embargo had placed "mountains of difficulties and obstacles" in the way of Cuban growth, though the primary cause of Cuba's perpetual economic failures (which Castro

failed to mention) is the Cuban leader's own deliberately chosen irrational economic policies and misguided alliances. Still, the embargo remains the main nonmilitary response the United States has to encourage Castro to adopt more constructive domestic and international policies. During the past two years certain aspects of the embargo were strengthened.

A more coordinated U.S. policy on economic matters should address the following areas:

6. The United States government should discourage Western banks from lending further funds to Cuba by discretely publicizing within the financial community data on the current state of the Cuban economy -specifically, its inability to repay its current debt to Western creditors, estimated at $5 billion in March 1987 - and Castro's extensive efforts to destabilize the international economic community by urging Third World countries to renounce their debts altogether.

7. The U.S. should reduce economic assistance to any recipient country that purchases Cuban goods or provides Cuba concessionary credits. The American people would most likely be outraged to learn that their tax dollars are indirectly subsidizing the most anti-American government on this earth. A reduction in such aid should be based on the amount of a country's expenditure on Cuban goods and/or concessionary credits granted to Havana multiplied by a constant, to introduce the element of sanctions. (For example, if Country A purchases $1 million worth of sugar from Cuba annually, that amount would be multiplied by 5 and the resulting figure of $5 million would be subtracted from the amount of economic assistance that Country A receives from the U.S.)

8. Those countries which trade with and provide economic assistance to Cuba and which receive U.S. financial assistance in paying interest on their foreign debts - for example, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina - shall be put on notice that the U.S. will withhold further such assistance if they continue to extend concessionary credits to Cuba.

9. The United States government should actively prosecute violators of the embargo, among them those companies that enter into joint economic ventures with the Cuban government. The U.S. government should apply the same regulations to the joint ventures as to purely Cuban businesses.

10. The United States should place more emphasis on enforcing the Foreign Agent Registration Act against businesses and organizations operating on Cuba's behalf in this country and, insofar as possible, in Panama. The United States should continue to publicize the names of

U.S. corporations and their front companies that do business directly with Cuba through third countries.

11. The U.S. government should review the licenses of agencies, companies, etc., that engage in travel or the sending of packages or money to Cuba. Such activity translates into sorely needed U.S. dollars for the Castro regime, enabling it to purchase high-technology equipment and spare parts from Western countries.

12. The United States should monitor international purchases of Cuba's basic products: sugar, tobacco, nickel, etc. Urge allies - particularly those receiving U.S. assistance - to purchase those products whenever possible from friendly, democratic countries in the Caribbean Basin.

13. The U.S. should extend the economic boycott of Cuba to Angola, a country that depends for its survival (and that of remunerative U.S. oil investments there) on Cuban military forces.

III. *Military/Intelligence Policy Recommendations*

14. The U.S. should increase military assistance to pro-Western governments that are resisting Cuban-supported insurgencies, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

15. The United States should increase or, as the case may be, provide assistance to any group that is at war with a regime which receives support from Cuba, especially freedom fighters in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan. (The authoritative *Jane's Defense Weekly* recently reported that Cuban troops were seen in Afghanistan.)

16. The U.S. government should act on the recommendations of Congressman Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who recently stated that, "The United States can help the cause of democracy in Cuba by encouraging the growth of an opposition, including human rights and religious groups, within the country. This assistance is necessary if the United States is to have any influence in Cuba over the long term." Such activity will also serve to distract Castro's attention and resources from his international exploits.

17. The U.S. Congress should hold public hearings on Cuban espionage operations in the United States. The American people must be made aware of the extent to which Fidel Castro works with the KGB to undermine the moral fiber of our youth (drugs), steal U.S. technology, and promote violence on U.S. soil.

IV. *Defection Policy Recommendation*

18. The United States should actively promote and publicize the defection of Cuban party, government, military and other officials, including sports and cultural personalities, by facilitating their escape and safe entrance into the United States or any other country of their choice. This would:

A. Provide continuing evidence of domestic dissatisfaction, at all levels of society, with the Cuban government and counter Castro's carefully crafted image abroad;
B. Greatly increase security problems for the Cuban government at home and in facilities abroad and force a diversion of resources from other activities;
C. Provide inside information on conditions in Cuba from prominent members of the government and society.

V. *Informational/ Educational Policy Recommendations*

Throughout his career, Castro has been extraordinarily successful in presenting his case to an international audience that often wanted to believe his experiments in Cuba were serving the interests of the Cuban people. His admirers abroad, and others who simply did not know the facts, have quite often innocently supplemented his propaganda campaigns to their own. Castro has been particulary successful in overselling his programs of health and education, and, until recently, in hiding his systematic repression of human rights.

The U.S. should thus increase the transmission of ideas and information on Cuba not only abroad but *within Cuba itself.* The free flow of ideas and information constitutes a danger well-understood by the Castro regime, for it serves to highlight for the Cuban people the contrast between fostering political change through rational debate of the alternatives as opposed to the coercive techniques favored by the Castro regime. Indicative of the significance of a heightened flow of information - achieved through the creation of Radio Martí - is the Castro regime's unprecedented assumption of a defensive posture in its propaganda war - witness its admission of an AIDS crisis in Cuba and its scrambling to downplay the defections of del Pino and Azpillaga.

In order to increase the flow of ideas and information in Cuba and abroad, the following actions should be taken:

19. If the results of a feasibility study on TV Martí (currently underway) are positive, the U.S. Congress should enact legislation allowing for its creation. The impact that a visual medium to complement Radio Martí would have is obvious: Cubans would actually be able to *see* the quality of life under a free market system (for example, simple shots of stocked grocery shelves could very well drive a Cuban to question his situation). Other possibilities include showing footage from Angolan war zones, highlighting the human cost of Castro's foreign adventures; former political prisoners could provide visual testimony to human rights abuses in Cuba; and defectors could address the Cuban people face-to-face.

20. The United States should expand Radio Martí broadcasts to 24 hours a day.

21. Voice of America should rebroadcast some of its Russian language programs intended for the Soviet Union to Soviet troops stationed in Cuba.

22. The United States should increase the international dissemination of facts and information about Cuba by:

A. Producing documentaries on the quality of services in Cuba, the ideological orientation of education, the absence of freedoms for intellectuals, labor unions and even government officials and similar subjects;
B. Producing films demonstrating Cuba's support for international terrorism and narcotics trafficking;
C. Making recent defectors and refugees (who are willing) more easily available to the media and other potentially interested parties, including members of the U.S. Congress.

23. The United States should increase the number of scholarships granted to students and others in Latin America and the Caribbean who could easily come under Soviet or Cuban influence through the educational programs of Soviet-bloc countries.

24. The U.S. should initiate psychological warfare programs, directed particularly toward the Cuban military, on such subjects as: (1) the costs -in lives, health, funds - of Cuba's involvement in wars abroad, particularly in the Angolan war; (2) Cuba's "colonial" dependence on the Soviet bloc for its economic survival; and (3) the "family dynasty" form of succession Fidel Castro has planned for the Cuban people.

25. Private organizations should be legally authorized to broadcast in short wave radio responsible and objective programs directed toward the unity of all Cubans (whether in Cuba or abroad) that are struggling for freedom.

26. The U.S. should encourage and provide moral support for the creation of a Russian-style *samizdat* (underground literature) in Cuba.

VI. *Immigration Policy Recommendations*

27. Now that the 1984 immigration agreement has been revived, the United States should for a limited period allow Cubans currently living in third countries to come to the United States under the quota. These third countries (for example, Costa Rica) are often U.S. allies who have much greater difficulty accommodating refugees than the U.S.

28. A long-term immigration policy should be accompanied by measures designed to prevent another mass, chaotic exodus such as Mariel -one Castro might precipitate, for example, by telling Cubans they can leave through the U.S. military base at Guantánamo. This should include a warning to Castro that another such move on his part will be met by punitive measures. (An authorized rush on Guantánamo, for example, might be answered by the closing, via blockade, of a major Cuban port.)

29. The U.S. Congress should hold public hearings on the methods by which the Castro regime "grants" visas to Cubans wishing to emigrate from Cuba or Cuban Americans wishing to travel to Cuba. Castro exploits these vulnerable individuals by charging exorbitant fees, based on the financial status of the individual involved (actually researched by the regime), for a visa to leave Cuba or to visit relatives there.

VII. *Human Rights*

30. The U.S. should continue to call world attention to the ignominious human rights record of the Castro regime and to push for an investigation of Cuba by the U.N. Human Rights Commission, as it did in 1987. Due to this effort, and that of Armando Valladares, Fidel Castro has been put on the defensive on this issue. Quite sensitive to world opinion, Castro will be hard-pressed to satisfy the burgeoning league of critics of his treatment of political prisoners, and of the Cuban people in general.

It should be emphasized that the issue of human rights in Cuba has moved beyond the point of whether or not they are being violated in Cuba to what the world community is going to do about it. The U.S. should be at the forefront of this campaign.

CONCLUSIONS

By all accounts - including those of Cuban leaders themselves - the Cuban government and people are entering a period of extremely difficult and potentially dangerous political, economic, and social upheaval. Fidel Castro, the country's single center of power, has moved past 60 with many items in his bursting domestic and international agendas either unfulfilled or a failure. The economy is in a shambles, the country faces an unprecedented and seemingly intractable hard currency crisis, and Castro's international fortunes have dropped markedly from an all-time high in the late 1970s.

For the Cuban people this means increasing austerity and, in all probability, repression, as Castro personally pushes economic and other policies stressing "moral" over material incentives. Whereas the watered-down Soviet development model used since the early 1970s did not work, Castro's current "solutions" - which run contrary to reforms being made these days in the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and to common sense and historical experience - are certain to make things worse still.

The Cuban leader is a compulsive gambler who likes to play politics for high stakes in the expectation of winning big, which he often has been able to do in the past. Under current and probable future circumstances the temptation to provoke a major confrontation with the United States - to distract attention from problems in Cuba and to restore his tarnished international image - will increase with every frustration he suffers.

The United States will play an important role in the developments in the years ahead no matter what it does. It stands to reason, then, that the U.S. government should take a more active role and direct developments, insofar as possible, toward the interests of the people of this country, the people of Cuba, and the people of this hemisphere.

This will require a thorough reevaluation of the experiences of the past twenty-eight years and the formulation of a prudent and realistic policy for the future. Nothing in the process is more important than the intellectual framework within which it is pursued. It must be one of highest regard for historical facts and experience, and a rational, but not insensitive, evaluation of that history and the characters involved.

In particular, policymakers must avoid the temptation to project their own principles and goals on Fidel Castro, who has shown by his words and actions that he does not share them. That is, we must not formulate policy on the sandy foundation of wishful thinking - here, specifically, an

unwillingness or inability to recognize that Castro is serious in his self-chosen, decades-long vendetta against the United States. To do so is to refuse to take a very difficult situation seriously and thus to fail to act responsibly in formulating a policy to respond to it.

When formulating a new policy towards Cuba, U.S. officials must keep in mind: (1) the U.S. interest in (and need for) a hemisphere of nonantagonistic developing nations; (2) Cuba's important role in advancing Soviet interests in the world and thus the need to pressure Moscow to withhold support for Castro's Third World adventures; (3) the need for a more coordinated program of pressures to restrict Castro's ability to move on his own or with Soviet assistance; and (4) the need to adopt a policy which will both discourage Castro from making any rash moves and convince him that should he provoke a showdown he will lose more than he will gain.

As for the Cuban people, the United States has historically underestimated its power and influence in communicating with those inside Cuba and abroad who long for democratic forms of government. A realization of this power could bring to fruition important changes within Cuba, leading ultimately to its democratization. The U.S., through broad-based, well-combined initiatives - which incorporate all the dimensions discussed above - could for the first time in history bring about changes in a well-entrenched Marxist-Leninist regime, thus reversing the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine.

This agenda indeed constitutes a challenge for U.S. foreign policy, but it is a challenge that must be faced if the U.S. is to protect its strategic interests, promote orderly, progressive development in the Caribbean Basin, and meet its obligations as the leader of the free world.

Also published by the Cuban American National Foundation:

U.S. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba: Policy Implications. A study for the proposal of a new U.S. government radio station for broadcasting to Cuba [Radio Martí], including discussion of the propaganda strategies of the Soviet Union and the Castro regime. Covers the information environment in Cuba and the impact of Radio Martí on it. Analyzes options for administration and programming.

The Cuban Scene: Censors and Dissenters by Professor Carlos Ripoll. This article describes the mechanisms of intellectual repression under the Castro government. Outlines the history of the Cuban government policy toward literature since 1959, and of the effects of these policies on Cuban literature. Reprinted from *Partisan Review,* Vol. XLVIII, No. 4. Distributed free of charge.

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
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Fidel Castro and the United States Press, by John P. Wallach. According to the author, Castro has "brilliantly" manipulated the American press corps throughout the last two decades. The essay explores how the American



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